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Abstract 
 Populists combine anti-elitism with a conviction that they hold a superior vision of 
what it means to be a true citizen of their nation. We expected support for populism to be 
associated with national collective narcissism²an unrealistic belief in the greatness of the 
national group, which should increase in response to perceived ingroup disadvantage. In 
Study 1 (Polish participants; n=1007), national collective narcissism predicted support for the 
populist Law and Justice party. In the experimental Study 2 (British participants; n=497), 
perceived long-term ingroup disadvantage led to greater support for Brexit and this 
relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism. In Study 3 (American 
participants; n=403), group relative deprivation predicted support for Donald Trump and this 
relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism. These associations were 
present even when we controlled for conventional national identification. We discuss 
implications of the link between collective narcissism and support for populism.  
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Populism as identity politics: 
Perceived ingroup disadvantage, collective narcissism and support for populism 
 On October 25th 2015 Law and Justice, a national-conservative party, won the 
parliamentary election in Poland. On June 23rd 2016 the UK voted to Leave the European 
Union. On Nov 8th 2016 Americans elected Trump for president. All these votes were in favor 
of nationalist populist ideas. According to Müller (2016), ³populism is always a form of 
identity politics´ (p. 3). He argues that populists combine anti-elitism with a conviction that 
they hold a morally superior vision of what it means to be a true citizen of their nation. Thus, 
despite its anti-establishment rhetoric, national populism seems to promote commitment to a 
group that needs recognition as the only legitimate representation of ³the people.´
Accordingly, any opposition to the populist agenda is condemned as a threat to national 
interests. In this paper, we propose that construing such a defensive national identity can arise 
as a compensation for feelings of ingroup disadvantage. 
 Although it was initially thought that poor economic conditions might be responsible 
for the recent rise of populism (Hernandez & Kriesi, 2015; Sides & Tesler, 2016), evidence 
for the role of economic hardship is mixed. There is some evidence that low income 
households support the ruling Law and Justice party in Poland (Roguska, 2016), yet in the 
U.S household income seems to play a minimal role in predicting support for Trump 
(Rothwell & Diego-Rosell, 2016). However, objective indices of material wealth might not 
accurately reflect how people experience their relative standing in the broader social system. 
Perceptions of relative deprivation capture a belief that one receives less than others or, 
raising this to WKHFROOHFWLYHOHYHOWKDWRQH¶VJURXSUHFHLYHVless than members of other groups 
(Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Such subjective perceptions might be better 
predictors of support for populist movements than objective indices of group status. 
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In line with this reasoning, Pettigrew (2017) suggested that support for Trump¶V
populism ZDVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKIHHOLQJVWKDWRQH¶VJURXSLVLQVRPHZD\GLVDGYDQWDJHGUHODWLYH
WRRWKHUV+HZURWH³7UXmp adherents feel deprived relative to what they expected to possess 
DWWKLVSRLQWLQWKHLUOLYHVDQGUHODWLYHWRZKDWWKH\HUURQHRXVO\SHUFHLYHRWKHUµOHVVGHVHUYLQJ¶
JURXSVKDYHDFTXLUHG´S111). In a similar vein, empirical research in Poland demonstrated 
that feelings of relative deprivation were indeed associated with support for Law and Justice 
(Winiewski, Jurczyszyn, Bilewicz, & Beneda, 2015). Furthermore, Mols & Jetten (2016) 
demonstrated that populist leaders can present situations of objective relative gratification 
(i.e., being relatively better off than others) under the guise of relative deprivation to 
manipulate the public. Such perceptions create feelings of injustice and resentment towards 
outgroups, including immigrants, who might be perceived as threatening the disadvantaged 
group¶V interests (e.g., Cramer, 2016; Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013; Mols & Jetten, 
2016). They might also kindle desires to glorify an allegedly deprived ingroup.  
$FRQYLFWLRQWKDWRQH¶VJURXSLVGLVDGYDQWDJHd relative to others might then be 
reflected in the way in which populists promote national identity. Specifically, it might foster 
defensive ideas about the ingroup¶V worth, which lacks acknowledgement from others. A 
belief in a great yet unappreciated ingroup might help compensate for a threat one would 
experience admitting that the ingroup deserves its disadvantage position (see Adorno, 
1963/1998; Fromm, 1973). Such a form of ingroup positivity is captured by the concept of 
collective narcissism²an unrealistic belief in ingroup¶V greatness contingent on external 
validation (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). Collective 
narcissism extends the concept of individual narcissism to the group level of analysis. While 
individual narcissism predicts interpersonal aggressiveness, collective narcissism predicts 
negative intergroup attitudes, especially towards groups perceived as threatening (Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; cf. Cichocka, Dhont, & 
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Makwana, in press). For example, collective narcissism predicted prejudice towards 
undocumented immigrants in the US (Lyons, Coursey, & Kenworthy, 2013), and Jews in 
Poland (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). Collective narcissism tends to correlate with 
measures of conventional in-group positivity (such as in-group identification; Leach et al., 
2008; or collective self-esteem; Luhtanen & Crocker 1992), as these concepts also reflect 
positive in-group evaluation. Yet, they have different consequences. When narcissistic and 
conventional ingroup positivity are considered together as predictors of intergroup attitudes, 
collective narcissism predicts prejudice, while non-narcissistic ingroup positivity predicts less 
negative attitudes (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Collective narcissism is 
also associated with perceptions of other groups conspiring against the ingroup (Cichocka, 
Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016)²a belief often accompanying any 
failures of populist governments (Müller, 2016).   
Past empirical work also suggests that collective narcissism might be a way to 
compensate feelings of ingroup disadvantage. For example, collective narcissism was 
associated with perceived group relative deprivation. In a study conducted in the UK, ethnic 
collective narcissism among Blacks was associated with a stronger conviction that Blacks 
were deprived relative to Whites (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Golec de Zavala and 
colleagues (2009) theorised that relative deprivation might increase collective narcissism 
among the deprived ingroup. Thus, collective narcissism may stem from feelings of 
resentment about the ingroup¶VGLVDGYDQWDJHGSRVLWLRQVHH&UDPHU 
We expected collective narcissism to increase as a consequence of perceived in-group 
disadvantage, and to account for the association between in-group disadvantage and support 
for populist ideas. We tested these predictions in three contexts. In Study 1, we examined the 
association between national collective narcissism (vs. identification) and support for the Law 
and Justice party in Poland. In Study 2, we manipulated in-group disadvantage and examined 
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its consequence for national collective narcissism (vs. identification) and support for Brexit in 
the U.K. We then tested whether collective narcissism accounted for the association between 
ingroup disadvantage and support for Brexit. In Study 3, conducted in the U.S., we examined 
whether national collective narcissism (vs. identification) accounted for the association 
between perceptions of ingroup disadvantage and support for Trump. All studies included at 
least 400 participants, which gave us a power of .80 for detecting even small associations 
between variables (for r = .14; Cohen, 1988; G*Power yields a target of 395 participants). 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we used data from Poland to examine the relationship between national 
collective narcissism versus conventional national identification and support for the populist 
Law and Justice party and its leader.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Study 1 involved a 2014 nationally representative 
sample of the 1007 Polish adults1: 472 men, 535 women, aged 18-87; 513 of them indicated 
the party they voted for in the 2011 parliamentary elections and 545 indicated the candidate 
they voted for in the 2010 presidential elections. Data was collected with the use of an 
address-based sampling (ABS) method by the Public Opinion Research Centre. Several 
measures2 and scales were presented to participants, including national collective narcissism, 
national identification, electoral preferences and demographics (gender, age and material 
status measured with one item: ³How do you assess the current material conditions of your 
household?´, 1=definitely bad to 5=definitely good).  
                                                          
1
 This dataset was also used by Jaworska (2016) and Cichocka, Górska, Jost, Sutton, & 
Bilewicz (in press). 
2
 All studies additionally measured system justification (see the Supplement). 
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Measures.  
National collective narcissism was measured with the 5-item version of the Collective 
Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), e.g., ³Polish nation 
deserves special treatment.´ Participants responded on a scale from 1=definitely disagree to 
6=definitely agree. 
National identification was operationalized as the group level-self-investment 
GLPHQVLRQRI/HDFKDQGFROOHDJXHV¶VRFLDOLGHQWLILFDWLRQVFDOH (Polish adaptation by 
Jaworska, 2016; see the Supplement for analyses involving the full scale). Ten items 
measured satisfaction with the ingroup, HJ³,DPJODGWREH3ROLVK´ centrality of the 
ingroupHJ³%HLQJ3ROLVKLVDQLPSRUWDQWSDUWRIKRZ,VHHP\VHOI´ and solidarity with 
inJURXSPHPEHUVHJ³,IHHODERQGZLWK3ROLVKSHRSOH´ Participants responded on a scale 
from 1=definitely disagree to 6=definitely agree.  
Law and Justice vote in parliamentary elections was measured with one item: ³For 
which party or organization did you vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections?´. Out of those 
who voted in the elections, 160 participants declared voting for Law and Justice; 353 
participants declared voting for another political party (e.g., Civic Platform, Democratic Left 
Alliance).  
-DURVáDZ.DF]\ĔVNLvote in presidential elections was measured with one item: ³For 
which candidate did you vote in 2010 presidential elections?´. Participants indicated one of 
two candidates that came out ahead during the first round of the presidential election: 
JaroVáDZ.DF]\ĔVNL/DZDQG-XVWLFH or %URQLVáDZ.RPRURZVki (Civic Platform). Out of 
those who voted in the election, 147 participants declarHGYRWLQJIRU.DF]\ĔVNLDQG for 
Komorowski.   
 




Zero-order correlations between variables and scale properties are presented in 
Table 1. National identification was significantly positively correlated with collective 
narcissism, so we accounted for their overlap in the regression analyses.
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Table 1 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 1) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Law and Justice vote 
1=Law and Justice; 0=other 
M=.31,  
SD=.46 
      
-DURVáDZ.DF]\ĔVNLYRWH 





     
3. National collective 
narcissism 








    
4. National identification 
10-item scale from 1 to 6  
.14[.06,.22] 
p = .002 
.07 [-.01,.16] 






   






7. Material status 
Scale from 1 to 5 
.10[.004,.19] 
p = .024 
.07[-.01,.15] 




p = .70 
.03[-.05,.12] 






p = .14 
-.05[-.11,.02] 




p = .36 
.03[-.03,.10] 
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Regression analyses. We conducted hierarchical binominal logistic regression 
analyses to investigate the effects of collective narcissism on populist votes for: Law and 
Justice as a party and .DF]\ĔVNLas the presidential candidate. Voting for Law and Justice (or 
KDF]\ĔVNLZDVFRGHGDVDQGvoting for any other party (or Komorowski) was coded as 0. 
We also controlled for demographics (age, gender, material status) 3 and national 
identification4.  
National collective narcissism as a predictor of Law and Justice vote in the 
parliamentary election. First, we regressed collective narcissism on Law and Justice vote 
(Table 2). In Step 1, we introduced national identification which was significantly positively 
associated with Law and Justice vote. In Step 2, we introduced collective narcissism and 
found its positive effect on Law and Justice vote. The relationship between identification and 
Law and Justice vote became non-significant, indicating that non-narcissistic national ingroup 
positivity was not associated with the Law and Justice vote. We also found a significant 




                                                          
3
 In all studies, we controlled for age and gender. In Studies 1 and 3 we controlled for material 
status/income (not available in Study 2), and in Study 3 we controlled for ethnicity (not 
available in Studies 1-2). Unless noted otherwise, across all studies results remain the same 
when we do not include demographic variables. 
4
 In all models multicollinearity was not a problem, with all VIFs < 2.0 (Rogerson, 2001). 
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Table 2 
Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Law and Justice Vote in the Parliamentary Election (Study 1) 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B(SE) OR OR CI95% p B(SE) OR OR CI95% p 
National identification 0.36(0.13) 1.43 [1.10,1.86] .01 -0.01(0.16) 1.00 [0.73,1.36] .99 
Age 0.002(0.01) 1.00 [0.99,1.02] .80 -0.002(0.01) 1.00 [0.98,1.01] .75 
Gender 0.24(0.20) 1.27 [0.86,1.87] .23 0.24(0.20) 1.27 [0.86,1.89] .24 
Material status -0.47(0.11) 0.63 [0.50,0.78] <.001 -0.47(0.11) 0.62 [0.50,0.78] <.001 











ǻ 2 log-likelihood 
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National collective narcissism as a prHGLFWRURI.DF]\ĔVNLYRWHLQSUHVLGHQWLDO
elections. Second, we regressed collective narcissism on .DF]\ĔVNLvote (Table 3). In Step 1 
we introduced national identification which was marginally significantly positively associated 
with .DF]\ĔVNLYRWH. In Step 2 we introduced collective narcissism and found its positive 
effect on .DF]\ĔVNLYRWH. The effect of LGHQWLILFDWLRQRQ.DF]\ĔVNLYRWHEHFDPHQRQ-
significant, indicating that non-narcissistic national ingroup positivity was not associated with 
the populist vote. Again, we found a significant negative effect of material status5.  
                                                          
5
  When we do not control for demographics, we find a significant positive effect of ingroup 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQRQ.DF]\ĔVNLYRWHLQ6WHS 
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Table 3 
Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting .DF]\ĔVNL9RWHLQ3UHVLGHQWLDO(lections (Study 1) 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B(SE) OR OR CI95% p B(SE) OR OR CI95% p 
National identification 0.22(0.12) 1.25 [0.98,1.59] .07 -0.10(0.15) 0.91 [0.68,1.21] .51 
Age -0.01(0.01) 1.00 [0.98,1.01] .43 -0.01(0.01) 0.99 [0.98,1.00] .18 
Gender 0.12(0.20) 1.13 [0.77,1.66] .54 0.13(0.20) 1.14 [0.77,1.69] .51 
Material status -0.36(0.11) 0.70 [0.57,0.87] .001 -0.36(0.11) 0.70 [0.56,0.87] .001 




600.81 2 log-likelihood 
ǻ 1DJHONHUNH¶VR2  .04 
ǻ 2 log-likelihood  17.6 
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The results of Study 1 provided initial support for our hypothesis that collective 
narcissism (and not non-narcissistic national identification) would predict voting for the 
populist Law and Justice party and its leader. In line with previous findings (Roguska, 2016), 
low material status was a significant predictor of adopting populist views. Still, Study 1 did 
not account for subjective feelings of ingroup disadvantage, which according to our 
assumptions should be an important predictor of support for populism. We address this issue 
in Studies 2 and 3.  
Study 2 
Study 2 was conducted in the context of the U.K. referendum to leave or remain a part 
of the European Union. A populist rhetoric of the United Kingdom Independence Party aimed 
to fuel anti-European attitudes by provoking British citizens to fight against a supposed influx 
of immigrants and to put national interest over those imposed by the EU (Farage, 2016). The 
principal message of the Leave campaign was that over the past half-century the EU had 
systematically diminished British influence and its sovereignty, so the best solution was to 
leave the union.  
Based on this rhetoric, we manipulated perceptions of British (ingroup) disadvantage 
in the context of the relationship between the U.K. and the EU. In addition, we varied the 
perceived longevity of ingroup disadvantage by making participants believe it was either short 
or long-lived. We tested whether the perception of ingroup disadvantage would result in a 
higher willingness to adopt populist views reflected in Brexit support. Moreover, we expected 
this relationship to be accounted for by national collective narcissism.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Study 2 was conducted among 525 participants 
recruited via Prolific Academic approximately seven weeks before the Brexit referendum (5-
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10 May 2016). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the only three experimental 
conditions (long-term vs. short-term ingroup disadvantage vs. baseline).  
We manipulated the perceived longevity of ingroup disadvantage based on the 
procedure by Blanchar & Eidelman (2013). In the long-term ingroup disadvantage condition, 
participants read an online article illustrating the history of the EU. The article emphasized the 
relationship between the U.K. and the EU as a long-term disadvantage to the U.K. In the 
short-term ingroup disadvantage condition, the article described the relationship as a recent 
development (though equally disadvantageous for the U.K.). In the baseline condition, the 
article described the history of the EU but omitted any indication of ingroup disadvantage (see 
the Supplement). Afterwards, participants completed measures of national collective 
narcissism and identification. The order of scale presentation was randomized and did not 
moderate the effects. Afterwards, participants were asked to indicate whether they thought the 
U.K. should leave the EU or not. 
This study included an attention check. Participants were asked to indicate the main 
topic of the manipulation text. Twenty-four participants who failed the attention check were 
excluded from the analyses. We also excluded four participants who indicated their 
nationality as other than British. The final sample included 497 British participants, 212 men, 
285 women, aged 18-72, 143 in the long-term ingroup disadvantage condition, 175 in the 
short-term ingroup disadvantage condition and 179 in the baseline condition. 
Measures.  
National collective narcissism was measured with a 9-item version of the Collective 
Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Participants responded on a scale from 
1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. 
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National identification was measured with the Social Identification Scale (Cameron, 
2004) which includes 12 items, capturing ingroup ties, e.g., ³I have a lot in common with 
other Brits.´FHQWUDOLW\HJ ³,QJHQHUDOEeing British is an important part of my self-
image.´DQGingroup affect, e.g., ³,QJHQHUDO,¶PJODGWREH%ULWLVK´3DUWLFLSDQts responded a 
scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.  
Brexit support was PHDVXUHGZLWKRQHLWHP³Should the United Kingdom remain a 
member of the European Union or leave the European Union?´. Participants responded to a 
scale from 1=definitely remain to 5=definitely leave6.   
Results  
Zero-order correlations across conditions and scale properties are presented in Table 
4. National identification was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism. 
Brexit support was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism, and national 
identifications. Thus, both types of ingroup positivity were positively related to adopting 
populist views. 
 
                                                          
6
 We also measured perception of immigration from within the EU to the UK as a problem or 
an opportunity. We found a marginally significant effect of long-term ingroup disadvantage 
on anti-immigration attitudes, and this effect was accounted for by collective narcissism (see 
the Supplement). 
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Table 4 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 2) 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Brexit support 
Scale from 1 to 5 
M=2.56, SD=1.41     
2. National collective narcissism 





   
3. National identification 











p = .58 
.03[-.06,.13] 









p < .001 
.09[.004,.18] 
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Regression analyses. We performed multiple regression analyses to investigate the 
effects of the experimental manipulation. In all analyses, experimental conditions (long-term 
ingroup disadvantage vs. short-term ingroup disadvantage vs. baseline) were recoded into two 
dummy variables: one encoded the difference between long-term disadvantage and the 
baseline; the other one encoded the difference between short-term disadvantage and the 
baseline. We entered the two dummy variables into the regression, controlling for the overlap 
between the two types of ingroup positivity, and demographics (age and gender). 
 Perceived ingroup disadvantage as a predictor of national collective narcissism. We 
found a significant positive effect of long-term ingroup disadvantage on collective narcissism, 
indicating that narcissistic ingroup positivity was higher in the long-term disadvantage 
condition than in the baseline condition. We did not, however, find a significant effect of 
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Table 5 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting National Collective Narcissism (Study 2) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 
Ingroup disadvantage as a predictor of national identification. We found a 
marginally significant negative effect of short-term ingroup disadvantage and significant 
negative effect of long-term ingroup disadvantage (Table 6). Thus, long-term ingroup 







 Step 1 
Predictor variable B t (489) p partial r [CI95%] 










.52 [.45, .59] 
Age 1.16 .05 [-.04, .14] 
Gender 
Short-term ingroup disadvantage (vs. baseline) 




 -.002 [-.09, .09] 
.03 [-.06, .12] 
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Table 6 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting National Identification (Study 2) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 
Perceived ingroup disadvantage as a predictor of Brexit support. To test the 
hypotheses that ingroup disadvantage will result in higher willingness to adopt populist views 
reflected in Brexit support, and that this relationship will be accounted for by collective 
narcissism, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Table 7).
 Step 1 
Predictor variable B t (489) p partial r [CI95%] 










.52 [.45, .59] 
Age 1.05 .05 [-.04, .13] 
Gender 
Short-term ingroup disadvantage (vs. baseline) 




.04 [-.05, .13] 
-.09 [-.17, .01] 
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Table 7 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Brexit Support (Study 2) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (489) p partial r [CI95%] B t (488) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.22 3.98 <.001 .18 [.08, .28] -0.10 -1.76 .08 -.08 [-.17, .01] 
Age 0.03 5.77 <.001 .25 [.17, .34] 0.03 5.84 <.001 .26 [.17, .34] 
Gender -0.02 -0.20 .84 -.01 [-.10, .09] -0.02 -0.20 .84 -.01 [-.10, .08] 
Short-term ingroup disadvantage (vs. baseline) 0.07 0.46 .64 .02 [-.06, .11] 0.03 0.23 .82 .01 [-.08, .10] 
Long-term ingroup disadvantage (vs. baseline) 0.47 3.09 .002 14 [.06, .23] 0.27 1.96 .05 .09 [-.01, .18] 





F 12.85 32.16 
ǻ F  19.31 
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In Step 1 we introduced national identification and two dummy variables. We found a 
significant positive effect of identification and a significant positive effect of long-term 
ingroup disadvantage on Brexit support, indicating that Brexit support was higher in the long-
term disadvantage condition relative to the baseline condition. We did not find a significant 
effect of short-term ingroup disadvantage on Brexit support.  
In Step 2 we introduced collective narcissism and found its positive effect on Brexit 
support. Non-narcissistic identification was a negative (albeit marginally significant) predictor 
of Brexit support. Furthermore, after introducing collective narcissism, we found a marginally 
significant positive effect of long-term disadvantage on Brexit support, and a non-significant 
effect of short-term disadvantage.  
To perform a full test of our hypothesis, we checked for an indirect effect of long-term 
and short-term disadvantage on Brexit support via collective narcissism. We used Model 4 of 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bootstrapped samples. The indirect effect of the 
perceived long-term ingroup disadvantage on Brexit support via collective narcissism was 
significant, with a bootstrap 95% bias-corrected confidence interval (95%CIbc) of 0.06 to 
0.35. The indirect effect of the perceived short-term ingroup disadvantage on Brexit support 
via collective narcissism was not-significant, 95%CIbc= -0.08, 0.16 (Figure 1). 
We additionally checked for indirect effects of ingroup disadvantage on Brexit support 
via identification. Both indirect effects via identification were not significant: for the long-
term disadvantage 95%CIbc= -0.001, 0.09, for the short-term disadvantage 95%CIbc= -0.002, 
0.07.  
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Figure 1. Indirect effects of long-term and short-term ingroup disadvantage on Brexit support 
via collective narcissism. Entries are standardized coefficients. R2 represents percentage of the 
outcome variables variation explained by the model. 
+
 p < .10 * p < .05. ** p < .001.  
Study 2 revealed that, relative to baseline, reading about the long-term disadvantage of 
the national ingroup increased support for Brexit, and that this relationship was accounted for 
by national collective narcissism (and not non-narcissistic identification). Reading about 
short-term ingroup disadvantage was not enough to encourage participants to support Brexit. 
In fact, it also was not strong enough to increase collective narcissism.  
Furthermore, national identification alone was significantly positively correlated with 
support for Brexit, but this association became negative (and marginally significant) when we 
adjusted for national collective narcissism. Although long-term ingroup disadvantage 
decreased non-narcissistic national identification, we did not find a significant indirect effect 
of ingroup disadvantage on Brexit support via non-narcissistic national identification. Thus, 
national collective narcissism, resulting from a perception of a long-term ingroup 
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Study 3 
In Study 3 we sought to examine the role of ingroup disadvantage and national 
collective narcissism in support for Trump. To this end, we examined whether support for 
Trump will be associated with group relative deprivation (Pettigrew, 2017), and whether this 
link will be accounted for by national collective narcissism.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. In Study 3 we used data from a survey conducted 
among 407 participants recruited via Prolific Academic approximately a month before the 
Presidential election (5-6 October 2016). Several measures were presented to participants, 
including national collective narcissism, national identification, group relative deprivation, 
electoral preferences and demographics (age, gender, family income over the last year 
measured on a scale from 1=less than $10,000 to 12=more than $150,000). We excluded data 
from four participants who reported their national identity as other than American or mixed 
American. The final sample included 403 American participants, 221 men, 182 women, aged 
18-70. Most (n=303) were White (not Hispanic), identified themselves as non-immigrants 
(n=386), and their mode income was between $50,000 and $59,999. 
Measures.  
National collective narcissism was measured as in Study 1, with respect to the 
Americans as the ingroup. Participants responded on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 
7=strongly agree. 
National identification was measured as in Study 2, with respect to the Americans as 
the ingroup. Participants responded on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.  
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Group relative deprivation was measured with one item which depended on 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶s identity based on similar items used in the Eurobarometer (Pettigrew et al., 
2008). Participants who identified themselves as non-immigrants (n=386) were asked about 
their situation in relation to immigrants; those who identified themselves as immigrants 
(n=17) were asked about their situation in relation to new immigrants: ³Would you say that 
over the last 5 years people like yourself in the U.S. have been economically 1=a lot better 
off, 2=better off, 3=the same, 4=worse of or 5=a lot worse off than most [new incoming] 
immigrants living here?´ 
Preference for Donald Trump ZDVPHDVXUHGZLWKRQHLWHP³Now please consider the 
current presidential nominees. Using the slider, please indicate how much you prefer one 
candidate over another, if you prefer Hillary Clinton you should move the slider toward the 
left (0=Hilary Clinton), and if you prefer Donald Trump move the slider to the right 
(10=Donald Trump).  If you feel neutral to both, then maintain the slider at 5.´7  
Results  
Zero-order correlations and scale properties are presented in Table 8. National 
identification was significantly positively related to collective narcissism. Preference for 
Trump was significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism, identification, and 
group relative deprivation. Group relative deprivation was significantly positively correlated 
with collective narcissism. We did not find a significant relationship between group relative 
deprivation and identification.   
                                                          
7
 We also measured individual relative deprivation and additional indices of support for 
Trump and other candidates. Collective narcissism was unrelated to support for Clinton or 
Sanders (see the Supplement).  
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Table 8 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 3)  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Preference for Trump 
Scale from 0 to 10 
M=3.16, 
SD=3.34 
       
2. National collective 
narcissism 






      
3. National identification 








     
4. Group relative 
deprivation 
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Regression analyses. We performed multiple regression analyses, in which we 
entered group relative deprivation, and controlled for national identification and 
demographics (age, gender, income, ethnicity). 
Group relative deprivation as a predictor of national collective narcissism. After the 
inclusion of control variables, we confirmed the significant positive effect of group relative 
deprivation on collective narcissism (Table 9). 
Table 9 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting National Collective Narcissism (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 
Group relative deprivation as a predictor of preference for Trump. To test the hypotheses 
that group relative deprivation will predict support for populism reflected in preference for 
Trump over Clinton, and that this relationship will be accounted for by collective narcissism, 
we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Table 10).
 Step 1 
Predictor variable B t (395) p partial r [CI95%] 












.51 [.43, .59] 
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Table 10 

















Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (394) p partial r [CI95%] B t (393) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.48 3.29 <.001 .16 [.06, .27] 0.27 1.64 .10 .08 [-.03, .20] 
Age 0.01 0.94 .35 .05 [-.06, .16] 0.01 0.99 .32 .05 [-.06, .15] 
Gender -1.09 -3.60 <.001 -.18 [-.27, -.08] -1.04 -3.44 .001 -.17 [-.26, -.07] 
Income 0.09 1.81 .07 .09 [.002, .20] 0.08 1.70 .09 .09 [-.02, .18] 
Ethnicity 0.63 1.80 .07 .09 [.000, .18] 0.60 1.71 .09 .09 [-.01, .18] 
Group relative deprivation 1.31 8.25 <.001 .38 [.29, .47] 1.23 7.59 <.001 .36 [.27, .44] 
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In Step 1 we introduced national identification and group relative deprivation as 
predictors of preference for Trump (over Clinton). We found significant positive effects for 
identification, and group relative deprivation. In Step 2 we introduced collective narcissism 
and found its positive effect on preferences for Trump. After introducing collective 
narcissism, we found a slightly weaker, although significant positive effect of group relative 
deprivation and a non-significant effect of identification 8. 
We then checked for an indirect effect of the group relative deprivation on preference 
for Trump via collective narcissism, following the same procedure as in Study 2. The indirect 
effect via collective narcissism was significant, 95%CIbc= 0.01,0.18 (identification did not 
show a similar indirect effect, 95%CIbc= -0.10,0.01).  
Study 3 corroborated the results of Study 2 by demonstrating that perceptions of 
ingroup disadvantage (here operationalized as group relative deprivation) were positively 
related to populist views and that this relationship was accounted for by national collective 
narcissism. As in Studies 1 and 2, national identification alone predicted populist views. 
However, when we adjusted for national collective narcissism we did not find a significant 
relationship between non-narcissistic identification with Americans and their preference for 
Trump.   
General Discussion 
In three studies, we demonstrated that national collective narcissism (but not non-
narcissistic national identification) is a robust predictor of adopting populist views. We 
                                                          
8
 When we do not account for demographics, the effects of collective narcissism and group 
deprivation remain significant, and the effect of identification on support for Trump is 
significant. 
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confirmed this pattern of results in three countries: Poland (support for the national 
conservative Law and Justice party), the UK (support for Brexit) and the US (preference for 
Trump over Clinton). The results of Study 2 and 3 additionally pointed to perceived ingroup 
disadvantage as a predictor of collective narcissism. 
This research contributes to our understanding of the role of group identity in fostering 
support for populist ideologies. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that collective narcissism 
accounted for the links between perceptions of ingroup disadvantage and support for populist 
ideas. Nevertheless, these results should be treated with caution given that our studies 
measured both the mediators and the outcomes. The significant indirect effects via collective 
narcissism indicate that this variable can help explain a certain amount of the variance shared 
between ingroup disadvantage and populism support, but does not provide evidence for the 
causal model (see MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000 for a discussion on possible 
interpretations of indirect effects). More research is needed to establish causality of the 
observed relationships, for example by manipulating collective narcissism as the mediator 
(Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010). Future research would also do well to rely less on single-item 
indices (e.g., by including multi-item measures of relative deprivation or populist attitudes). 
Our research focused on populism associated mostly with the right-wing side of the 
political scene, which often manifests in nationalist attitudes. Collective narcissism tends to 
be positively correlated with nationalism (e.g., Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010). Yet, it is 
a broader construct (it can be used in relation to national but also other social groups) and 
captures a concern with protecting the in-grRXS¶VLPDJHrather than the need for dominance 
characteristic for nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; see Golec de Zavala et al., 
2009). Following Müller (2016), we argue that it is the need to be recognized as the only true 
and moral representation of a nation that drives populism. Nevertheless, it is of course likely 
that the relationships observed here are at least partially due to the associations between 
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nationalism and collective narcissism. Future research would do well to explore these 
associations more closely. More work is also needed to examine the links between collective 
narcissism and populism in other socio-political contexts, for example in the context of left-
wing populism in Latin America.9    
Overall, our results might at least partially explain why populism is often linked to 
prejudicial attitudes and behaviors. Research demonstrates that both group relative 
deprivation (e.g., Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and collective narcissism (see Cichocka, 2016 
for a review) tend to predict negative intergroup attitudes. At the same time, research 
indicates that feelings of injustice and deprivation might stimulate increased collective action 
aimed at changing LQJURXS¶V undesirable circumstances (van Zomeren, Postmes & Spear, 
2008). Indeed, some see populist movements as manifestations of those disadvantaged by the 
V\VWHP³WDNLQJEDFNFRQWURO´Farage, 2016). These attempts to tackle (perceived) inequality 
are likely to be at odds with positive intergroup attitudes (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & 
Durrheim, 2012). It is important to note, however, that collective action can take more, or less 
disruptive forms. There is evidence showing that collective narcissism stimulates disruptive 
forms of protest (Górska & Bilewicz, 2017), which might at least partially explain why we 
often observe violent behaviors at populist rallies (Jacobs, 2016; Kellner, 2016). Such 
defensive responses might be especially likely when objectively privileged groups are led to 
believe they are relatively disadvantaged and threatened by minorities (Mols & Jetten, 2016). 
                                                          
9
 Note that Study 3 included measures of attitudes toward other candidates, including Sanders. 
They were not associated with collective narcissism (see the Supplement). Although some 
commenters suggest that Sanders represents left-wing populism (Kazin, 2016), we base our 
understanding of populism on Müller (2016), who argues that populism is not only anti-elitist 
but also anti-pluralist, and as such does not apply to Sanders. 
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This can lead to narcissistic ideas of threatened ingroup greatness and, in turn, support for 
populist politicians.  
The current work contributes to our understanding of support for populism, but it also 
has broader implications for the study of collective narcissism. While there is vast evidence 
for the correlates and consequences of collective narcissism (for overviews see Cichocka, 
2016; Golec de Zavala, 2011), less is known about situational factors that contribute to the 
increase of this form of ingroup positivity. Past work shows that it might strengthen when 
people lack personal control (Cichocka et al., in press), or when the group is criticised (Golec 
de Zavala, 2010). Study 2 demonstrated that collective narcissism increased in response to 
ingroup disadvantage, especially when the disadvantage was perceived as long lasting. This 
suggests that the narrative of relative disadvantage, fuelled by populist leaders, might 
reinforce this defensive and destructive national ingroup positivity. At the same time, it is also 
possible that the two variables reinforce each other, and that collective narcissism further 
increases perceptions of relative ingroup disadvantage. Rather than unifying a people to make 
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Study 1 Additional Analyses 
We repeated the regression analyses with the use of the full social identification scale 
(Leach et al., 2008), that is including both the group-level self-investment and group-level 
self-GHILQLWLRQFRPSRQHQWVRIQDWLRQDOLGHQWLILFDWLRQĮ = .95, M = 4.84, SD = 0.96). Results 
were similar to those reported in Study 1 (see Tables S1 and S2).   
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Table S1 
Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Law and Justice Vote in Parliamentary Elections (Study 1) 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B(SE) OR OR CI95% p B(SE) OR OR CI95% p 
National identification (full scale) 0.45(0.14) 1.57 [1.19, 2.08] .001 0.08(0.17) 1.08 [0.77, 1.50] .66 
Age <0.001(0.01) 1.00 [0.99, 1.01] .99 -0.003(0.01) 1.00 [0.98, 1.01] .66 
Gender 0.22(0.20) 1.25 [0.85, 1.84] .27 0.23(0.20) 1.26 [0.85, 1.88] .25 
Material status -0.46(0.11) 0.63 [0.51, 0.78] <.001 -0.48(0.11) 0.62 [0.50, 0.78] <.001 
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Table S2 
Results of a Binomial /RJLVWLF5HJUHVVLRQ3UHGLFWLQJ.DF]\ĔVNL9RWHLQ3UHVLGHQWLDO(OHFWLRQV6WXG\ 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B(SE) OR OR CI95% p B(SE) OR OR CI95% p 
National identification (full scale) 0.31(0.13) 1.36 [1.05, 1.76] .02 -0.01(0.16) 0.99 [0.73, 1.34] .93 
Age -0.01(0.01) 0.99 [0.98, 1.01] .30 -0.01(0.01) 0.99 [0.98, 1.00] .14 
Gender 0.11(0.20) 1.12 [0.76, 1.65] .56 0.13(0.20) 1.14 [0.77, 1.69] .51 
Material status -0.36(0.11) 0.70 [0.57, 0.87] .001 -0.37(0.11) 0.70 [0.56, 0.86] .001 








ǻ 2 log-likelihood  
.04 
14.72 
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Study 1 also included a measure of justification of the European Union system. Three 
items selected from the System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) were adjusted to the 
context of the European Union, HJ³,QJHQHUDO,ILQGWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQV\VWHPWREH
fair.´3DUWLFLSDQWVUHVSRQGHGRQD-point response scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree 
to 7 = strongly agree Į M = 3.66, SD = 1.36). Although EU system justification was 
significantly negatively associated with voting for Law and Justice, B = -0.22, SE = 0.08, 
OR= 0.80 [0.69, 0.94], p =  .01, RU.DF]\ĔVNLB = -0.37, SE = 0.08, OR = 0.69 [0.59, 0.81], 
p<.001, controlling for EU system justification did not affect the pattern of results for 
FROOHFWLYHQDUFLVVLVPDQGYRWLQJIRU/DZDQG-XVWLFHRU.DF]\ĔVNL
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Study 2 Manipulation Text 
Long-term disadvantage condition  
8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKH8.¶V/RQJ5HODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8 
:LWKWKH(8UHIHUHQGXPORRPLQJQHDUTXHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKH8.¶VSROLWLcal and 
economic interests surface. Specifically, questions regarding how its membership with the EU 
KDVLQIOXHQFHGLWVLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGLQJ7KH8.¶VSRZHUKDVXQGRXEWHGO\EHHQ
compromised over many decades, particularly following its gradual withdrawal from its 
colonial empire and initial refusal to join the EU following World War II. Having lost its 
empire, Britain perhaps suffered an imperial hangover, and strived to establish its new role by 
continuing to give orders, rather than take them. 
Realising it was fighting a losing battle, the UK finally agreed to join the EU in 1973, 
then called the Common Market. As the EU grew in size and power over the decades, it 
continued to increase its sphere of influence and began shaping more aspects of daily life in 
WKH8.³7KH(8¶VLQYROYHPHQW>LQWKH8.@KDVOHGWRERWKSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHRXWFRPHV´
said former Foreign Secretary Lord Dunn. For example, although the UK has decreasing 
power over its borders, it can be argued that the flow of immigrants is fuelling economic 
growth. Furthermore, despite being charged billions of pounds in membership fees, its 
membership in the EU has resulted in easier trade and increased security. 
7KH(8¶VLQIOXHQFHRYHUWKH8.¶VGRPHVWLFDQGIRUHLJQSROLFLHVKDVEHHQHVSHFLDOO\
strong due to the long-lasting decline of the UK as a world power. Considering the increasing 
dependence of the UK on the EU over the past decades, the upcoming referendum highlights 
WKHEXUQLQJTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKH8.¶VIXWXUHOLHVZLWK(XURSHRUQRW 
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Short-term disadvantage condition  
8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKH8.¶V5HFHQW5HODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8 
:LWKWKH(8UHIHUHQGXPORRPLQJQHDUTXHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKH8.¶VSROLWLFDODQG
economic interests surface. Specifically, questions regarding how its membership with the EU 
KDVLQIOXHQFHGLWVLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGLQJ7KH8.¶VSRZHUKDVXQGRXEWHGO\EHHQ
compromised in recent years, particularly following its gradual withdrawal from its colonial 
empire and initial refusal to join the EU following World War II. Having lost its empire, 
Britain perhaps suffered an imperial hangover, and strived to establish its new role by 
continuing to give orders, rather than take them. 
Realising it was fighting a losing battle, the UK finally agreed to join the EU in 1973, 
then called the Common Market. As the EU grew in size and power over the past few years, it 
continued to increase its sphere of influence and began shaping more aspects of daily life in 
WKH8.³7KH(8¶VLQYROYHPHQW>LQWKH8.@KDVOHGWRERWKSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHRXWFRPHV´
said former Foreign Secretary Lord Dunn. For example, although the UK has decreasing 
power over its borders, it can be argued that the flow of immigrants is fuelling economic 
growth. Furthermore, despite being charged billions of pounds in membership fees, its 
membership in the EU has resulted in easier trade and increased security. 
7KH(8¶VLQIOXHQFHRYHUWKH8.¶VGRPHVWLFDQGIRUHLJQSROLFLHVKDVEHHQHVSHFLDOO\
strong due to the recent decline of the UK as a world power. Considering the increasing 
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Baseline condition  
Understanding the EU 
With the EU referendum looming near, questions regarding the role of the EU have 
begun to surface. Following the Second World War, there were efforts to prevent future 
conflict by increasing economic interdependence between European countries. This led to the 
signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Italy, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). The UK initially 
refused to join, but eventually agreed to an accession treaty in 1972, thus officially joining the 
EU on the 1st of January, 1973. 
Since then, the EU continued to grow in size and power, and expanded its sphere of 
influence over the 28 European countries that constitute it today. Membership in the EU, 
essentially a political and economic membership between its members, requires extra 
responsibilities and offers extra benefits. For example, although its members have to keep 
their borders open, this makes it easier for people to travel and work in other countries. 
Furthermore, despite charging billions of pounds in membership fees, membership in the EU 
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Study 2 Additional Analyses 
Study 2 additionally included measures of: (a) negative immigration attitudes, which 
can be considered another indicator of populism, and (b) system justification.  
Negative immigration attitudes were measured with RQHLWHP³7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RX
FRQVLGHULPPLJUDWLRQIURPZLWKLQWKH(8WRWKH8.WREHDSUREOHPRUDQRSSRUWXQLW\"´
Participants responded to a scale from 1=definitely an opportunity to 5=definitely a problem 
(M = 3.13, SD = 1.21). Brexit support was significantly related to perceiving immigration as a 
problem r(495) = .55, p<.001. Therefore, we conducted additional analyses treating 
immigration attitudes as the DV. 
System justification with respect to the EU was measured with eight items from the 
System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003). Participants responded on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree Į M = 3.90, SD = 1.20). 
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Table S3 
Correlations with additional variables (Study 2) 
Measures 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Brexit support 
Scale from 1 to 5 
M=2.56, SD=1.41     
2. National collective narcissism 





   
3. National identification 








4. Negative immigration attitudes 










5. System justification 










 Į  
SUPPLEMENT                                                                                                                     50 
 
Perceived ingroup disadvantage as a predictor of immigration attitudes. A 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the effects of long-term and 
short-term ingroup disadvantage on negative immigration attitudes, as well as whether this 
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Table S4 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Immigration Attitudes (Study 2) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (493) p partial r [CI95%] B t (492) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.32 6.56 <.001 .28 [.19, .37] 0.01 0.17 .86 .01 [-.09, .10] 
Short-term ingroup disadvantage (vs. baseline) -0.02 -0.14 .89 -.01 [-.10, .08] -0.05 -0.46 .65 -.02 [-.11, .07] 
Long-term ingroup disadvantage (vs. baseline) 0.25 1.92 .06 .09 [-.004, .18] 0.07 0.58 .56 .03 [-.06, .12] 





F 16.08 49.59 
ǻ F  31.51 
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In Step 1 we introduced national identification and the two dummy variables. We 
found a significant positive effect of identification and a marginally significant positive effect 
of long-term ingroup disadvantage on negative immigration attitudes (i.e., perceiving 
immigration to be a problem rather than opportunity). We did not find a significant effect of 
short-term ingroup disadvantage on immigration attitudes.  
In Step 2 we introduced national collective narcissism and found its significantly 
positive effect on negative immigration attitudes. Once we accounted for the variance shared 
with collective narcissism, non-narcissistic national identification became a non-significant 
predictor of immigration attitudes. Furthermore, after introducing collective narcissism into 
regression, long-term ingroup disadvantage also became a non-significant predictor of 
immigration attitudes. 
To perform a full test of our hypothesis, we checked for an indirect effect of the 
perceived long-term and short-term ingroup disadvantage on negative immigration attitudes 
via national collective narcissism with 10,000 bootstrapped samples. The indirect effect of the 
long-term ingroup disadvantage on negative immigration attitudes via national collective 
narcissism was significant 95%CIbc = 0.06, 0.32. The indirect effect of the short-term ingroup 
disadvantage on negative immigration attitude via national collective narcissism was not-
significant, 95%CIbc = -0.08, 0.15. 
 We additionally checked for an indirect effect of ingroup disadvantage on negative 
immigration attitude via national identification. Both indirect effects via national 
identification were not significant: for the long-term ingroup disadvantage 95%CIbc = -0.03, 
0.04, for the short-term ingroup disadvantage 95%CIbc =-0.02, 0.03.  
Analyses controlling for system justification. We also checked whether results change 
when controlling for system justification. Although EU system justification was significantly 
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negatively associated with voting Leave, B = -0.80 [-0.87, -0.73], SE = 0.04, ȕ= -.67, p<.001, 
and with perceiving immigration as a problem, B = -0.33 [-0.41, -0.25], SE = 0.04, ȕ =  -.32, 
p<.001, controlling for EU system justification did not affect the pattern of results for 
collective narcissism and these two outcomes. 
Study 3 Additional Analysis 
Study 3 included additional indices of support for Trump as well as the two other 
major candidates: Clinton and Sanders. Therefore, we repeated out analyses with these 
variables included as the DVs. In Study 3 we also included measures of individual relative 
deprivation and system justification, therefore we repeated the analyses reported in the text 
controlling for these variables. 
Measures.  
Feelings towards Trump, Clinton and Sanders. :HDVNHGIRUUHVSRQGHQWV¶JHQHUDO
feelings about: (1) Donald Trump (M =1.71, SD =  2.71), (2) Hilary Clinton (M =3.95, SD = 
3.23) and (3) Bernie Sanders (M =6.46, SD = 3.30), using a 10-point thermometer scale, with 
ratings between 5 and 10 degrees indicating a favourable perception of each of the candidates 
and scores ranging from 0 to 5 indicating an unfavourable view of each of the candidates.  
Support for Trump, Clinton and Sanders. General support was measured using a 
10-point scale, from 0 = No Support at All to 10 = Fully Support. We measured support for 
Trump (M = 2.71, SD = 2.88), Clinton (M = 5.26, SD = 3.42) and Sanders (M = 7.42, SD = 
$GGLWLRQDOO\SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG³&RQVLGHULQJZKRZDVQRPLQDWHGDIWHU
SULPDULHVFDXFXVZKRGR\RXVXSSRUWQRZ"´5HVSRQVHFDWHJRULHVIRUWKLVLWHPZHUH 1 = 
Hilary Clinton (n = 248), 2 = Donald Trump (n = 81) and 3 = Other (n = 73). Categories 1 
and 3 were collapsed, creating a categorical variable indicating support for Trump compared 
to all other candidates.  
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Individual relative deprivation was measured with one item by Pettigrew, Christ, 
:DJQHU0HHUWHQVDQG=LFN³Over the last 5 years have you been economically a lot 
better off, better off, the same, worse off, or a lot worse off than other Americans people lie 
\RXUVHOI"´Participants rated the statement on a scale from 1 = A lot better off to 5 = A lot 
worse off (M = 3.00, SD = 0.97).  
 System justification with respect the US political system was measured with 
16 items from the Political System Justification Scale (Jost et al., 2010). Participants 
responded on a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
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Results. 
Correlations including the additional continuous variables are presented below (Table S5). 
Table S5 
Zero-order correlations [and 95% Confidence Intervals]  between Continuous Variables (Study 2)  
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p <.001  
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[.01, .21]  
 p =.02  
-.26             
[-.36, -.16] 
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Analyses with three additional indices of preference for Trump. We examined 
whether the pattern of results would hold for the three additional indices of preference for 
Trump (Tables S6 ± S8). In the first steps of the analyses, we found that group relative 
deprivation was a significant predictor of general feelings about Trump, and both the 
continuous and categorical indices of support for Trump. In second steps of the analyses, we 
found that national collective narcissism was a significant predictor of feelings about Trump 
(Table S6), and support for Trump measured with the continuous variable (Table S7), but the 
effect was not significant for support for Trump versus other candidates measured with the 
categorical variable (Table S8). We additionally examined the indirect effects and found that 
national collective narcissism significantly accounted for the association between group 
relative deprivation and 1) feelings towards Trump (95%CIbc = .02, .17), 2) support for 
Trump (95%CIbc = .03, .20), but not 3) support for Trump vs. other candidates (95%CIbc = -
.03, .13). 




Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Feelings about Donald Trump (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples.
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (394) p partial r [CI95%] B t (393) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.46 3.82 <.001 .19 [.09, .29] 0.26 1.84 .07 .09 [-.02, .20] 
Age 0.02 1.91 .056 .10[-.01, .20] 0.02 1.98 .05 .10 [-.02, .20] 
Gender 
-0.60 -2.38 .02 -.12 [-.21, -.03] -0.54 -2.18 .03 -.11 [-.19, -.01] 
Income 0.09 2.34 .02 .12 [.03, .20] 0.09 2.20 .03 .11 [.02, .20] 
Ethnicity 0.42 1.43 .15 .07 [-.01, .17] 0.38 1.31 .19 .07 [-.03, .15] 
Group relative deprivation 0.86 6.48 <.001 .31 [.21, .40] 0.77 5.76 <.001 .28 [.19, .28] 
National collective narcissism 
   

















Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Support for Donald Trump (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples.
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (395) p partial r [CI95%] B t (394) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.53 4.11 <.001 .20 [.10, .31] 0.28 1.89 .06 .10 [-.03, .21] 
Age 0.02 1.91 .06 .10[-.02, .21] 0.24 2.00 .05 .10 [-.02, .21] 
Gender 
-0.43 -1.59 .11 -.08[-.17, .01] -0.36 -1.36 .18 -.07 [-.16, .03] 
Income 0.08 1.90 .06 .10[.01, .19] 0.07 1.74 .08 .09 [-.01, .19] 
Ethnicity 0.61 1.95 .05 .10[.01, .19] 0.57 1.84 .07 .09 [.003, .18] 
Group relative deprivation 0.79 5.55 <.001 .27 [.17, .37] 0.69 4.79 <.001 .23 [.14, .33] 
National collective narcissism 
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Table S8 
Results of a Logistic Regression Predicting Support for Donald Trump (vs. other Candidates; Study 3) 
 
     Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B(SE) OR OR CI95% p B(SE) OR OR CI95% p 
National identification 0.65(.15) 1.92 [1.43,2.58] <.001  0.53(0.17) 1.70 [1.21,2.39] .002 
Age 0.01(0.01) 1.01 [0.99,1.04] .39 0.01(0.01) 1.01  [0.99,1.04] .34 
Gender 
-0.44(0.30) 0.65 [0.36,1.16] .14 -0.41(0.30) 0.66 [0.37,1.19] .17 
Income 0.09(0.05) 1.09 [1.00,1.20] .06 0.08(0.05) 1.09 [0.99,1.19] .08 
Ethnicity 0.74(0.40) 2.09 [0.98,4.48] .06 0.70(0.39) 1.96 [0.92,4.21] .08 
Group relative deprivation 1.04(0.17) 2.83 [2.05,3.91] <.001 0.99(0.17) 2.70 [1.95,3.74] <.001 
National collective narcissism 
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Analyses on preference for other candidates. We conducted regression analyses to 
examine the effects of group relative deprivation and collective narcissism on feelings and 
support towards Sanders and Clinton (see Tables S9-S12). Overall, these analyses revealed 
that collective narcissism was not a positive predictor of Sanders or Clinton preferences. In 
fact, collective narcissism marginally negatively predicted feelings about Sanders (this effect 
was significant when demographics were not controlled for)
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Table S9 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Feelings about Hilary Clinton (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (394) p partial r [CI95%] B t (393) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.11 0.72 .47 .04 [.05, -.07] 0.01 0.08 .94 .004 [-.10, .11] 
Age 0.01 0.79 .43 .04 [-.06, .13] 0.01 0.81 .42 .04[-.05, .14] 
Gender 1.24 4.05 <.001 .20 [.11, .30] 1.26 4.12 <.001 .20 [.11, .31] 
Income 
-0.003 -0.06 .95 -.003 [-.10, .09] -0.01 -0.12 .91 -.01[-.10, .09] 
Ethnicity 
-0.61 -2.70 .09 -.09 [-.18, .01] -0.62 -1.74 .08 -.09[-.18, .01] 
Group relative deprivation 
-1.12 -6.96 <.001 -.33 [-.42, -.24] -1.16 -7.02 <.001 -.33[-.42, -.24] 
National collective narcissism 
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Table S10 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Support for Hilary Clinton (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (395) p partial r [CI95%] B t (394) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.09 0.57 .57 .03 [-.07, .13] -0.02 -0.12 .90 -.01 [-.11, .12] 
Age 0.01 0.45 .65 .02 [-.07, .12] 0.01 0.47 .64 .02 [-.07, .12] 
Gender 1.49 4.68 <.001 .23 [.14, .32] 1.51 4.76 <.001 .23 [.14, .33] 
Income 
-0.01 -0.28 .78 -.01 [-.11, .09] -0.02 -0.34 .74 -.02 [-.11, .08] 
Ethnicity 
-0.78 -2.12 .04 -11[-.20, -.002] -0.80 -2.17 .03 -.11 [-.20, -.001] 
Group relative deprivation 
-1.24 -7.43 <.001 -.35 [-.44, -.27] -1.29 -7.52 <.001 -.35 [-.44, -.27] 
National collective narcissism 
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Table S11 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Feelings about Bernie Sanders (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (393) p partial r [CI95%] B t (392) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 
-0.62 -4.18 <.001 -.21 [-.31, -.10] -0.47 -2.69 .01 -.14 [-.25, -.04] 
Age 
-0.02 -1.63 .10 -.08 [-.19, .02] -0.02 -1.66 .10 -.08 [-.18, .02] 
Gender 0.38 1.24 .22 .06 [-.04, .17] 0.34 1.10 .27 .06 [-.05, .16] 
Income 
-0.10 -1.98 .05 -.10 [-.19, .004] -0.09 -1.89 .06 -.10 [-.19, .01] 
Ethnicity 
-0.96 -2.66 .01 -.13[-.22, -.04] -0.93 -2.58 .01 -.13 [-.21, -.03] 
Group relative deprivation 
-0.85 -5.19 <.001 -.25 [-.35, -.16] -0.78 -4.70 <.001 -.23 [-.32, -.14] 
National collective narcissism 
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Table S12 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Support for Bernie Sanders (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (395) p partial r [CI95%] B t (394) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 
-0.65 -3.97 <.001 -.20 [-.30, -.11] -0.56 -2.92 .004 -.15 [-.25, -.04] 
Age 
-0.04 -2.24 .03 -.11[-.21, -.01] -0.04 -2.26 .02 -.11 [-.22, -.02] 
Gender 0.15 0.43 .67 .02[-.07, .13] 0.12 0.36 .72 .02 [-.08, 12] 
Income 
-0.10 -1.83 .07 -.09 [-.19, .01] -0.10 -1.77 .08 -.09 [-.19, .02] 
Ethnicity 
-1.00 -2.51 .01 -.13[-.21, -.03] -0.98 -2.47 .01 -.12 [-.21, -.03] 
Group relative deprivation 
-0.80 -4.46 <.001 -.22 [-.31, -.12] -0.76 -4.15 <.001 -.21 [-.30, -.11] 
National collective narcissism 
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Analyses controlling for individual relative deprivation. Then, we conducted 
regression analyses to examine the effects of group relative deprivation, controlling for 
individual-relative deprivation. When we controlled for individual relative deprivation, we 
still found a significant positive relationship between national identification and national 
collective narcissism. We also found a significant positive effect of group relative deprivation 
on national collective narcissism. We did not find, however, a significant effect of individual 
relative deprivation on national collective narcissism (Table S13).  
Second, we tested whether group relative deprivation significantly positively predict 
preference for Trump over Clinton in the presidential elections, and whether this relationship 
would be accounted for by national collective narcissism when controlled for individual 
relative deprivation (Table S14). The effect of group relative deprivation on preference for 
Trump was significant, but the effect of individual relative deprivation was not. Furthermore, 
after controlling for individual deprivation, we still found a significant effect of collective 
narcissism in Step 2. We checked for an indirect effect of the group relative deprivation on 
preference for Trump (over Clinton) via collective narcissism, controlling for individual 
relative deprivation. The effect remained significant, 95%CIbc = 0.01, 0.20. Controlling for 
individual relative deprivation also did not affect the association between collective 
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Table S13 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Collective Narcissism When Controlled for 
Individual Relative Deprivation (Study 3) 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples.
 Step 1 
Variables B t (395) p partial r [CI95%] 












.51 [.44, .60] 









-.08 [-.17, .02] 
.06 [-.05, .16] 
.04 [-06, .14] 
.19 [.09, .29] 
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Table S14 
Results of a Multiple Regression Predicting Preference for Donald Trump Win in Presidential Elections (Study 3) 
 
 
Note. CI95% = confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictor variable B t (393) p partial r [CI95%] B t (392) p partial r [CI95%] 
National identification 0.50 3.45 .001 .17 [.07, .28] 0.30 1.79 .08 .09 [-.01, .20] 
Age 0.01 0.76 .45 .04 [-.07, .15] 0.01 0.82 .41 .04 [-.06, .16] 
Gender 
-1.10 -3.65 <.001 -.18[-.27, -.09] -1.05 -3.49 .001 -.17 [-.27, -.07] 
Income 0.10 2.07 .04 .10 [.01, .19] 0.09 1.96 .05 .10 [.000, .20] 
Ethnicity 0.59 1.66 .10 .08 [-.01, .18] 0.55 1.57 .12 .08 [-.01, .17] 
Group relative deprivation 1.21 6.96 <.001 .33 [.23, .42] 1.13 6.42 <.001 .31 [.21, .40] 
Individual relative deprivation 0.26 1.50 .14 .08 [-.02, .18] 0.26 1.47 .14 .07 [-.03, .17] 
National collective narcissism 
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Analyses controlling for system justification. Finally, we conducted regression 
analyses to examine the effects of collective narcissism on support of and feelings towards 
each candidate, when controlling for political system justification.   
Political system justification was significantly positively associated with the various 
indices of support for Trump (see Table S5). However, controlling for political system 
justification did not affect the pattern of results for collective narcissism and the various 
indices of Trump support. In the full regression models predicting preference, support and 
feeling for Trump, political system justification was no longer a significant predictor (ȕs 
between -.02 and 10, all ps > .08), while the effects of collective narcissism remained 
significant. In the logistic regression model, controlling for political system justification, B = 
0.06, SE = 0.18, OR=1.06 [0.75, 1.49], p=.74, also did not affect the non-significant effect of 
collective narcissism on support for Trump (vs. other candidates). 
Moreover, although political system justification was a significant positive predictor 
for both feelings towards, B=0.48[0.11, 0.94], SE = 0.19, ȕ=.15, p=.01, and support for 
Clinton, B=0.53 [0.15, 0.90], SE=0.19, ȕ=.15, p=.01, controlling for political system 
justification did not affect the non-significant effect of collective narcissism on the two 
indices for Clinton support.  
Further, political system justification was significantly negatively associated with the 
various indices of support for Bernie Sanders. Political system justification was a significant 
negative predictor for feelings towards Sanders, B=-0.48 [-0.85, -0.11], SE=0.19, ȕ= -.14, 
p=.01, and support for Sanders, B=-0.57 [-0.98, -0.17], SE=0.21, ȕ= -.16, p=.01. However, 
controlling for political system justification did not affect the effect of collective narcissism 
on feelings towards Sanders. 
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